Transcendental or Material Oscillation? An Alternative Reading of Friedrich Schlegel’s Alternating Principle (Wechselerweis)
Robert S. Leventhal
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that Schlegel's 1796 review of Jacobi's Woldemar marks the beginning of his philosophical inquiry into the basic proposition (Grundsatz) and that Schlegel's "alternating principle" (Wechselerweis) should be read as an alternative to the foundationalist approaches of Reinhold and Fichte. |
Abstract
An Alternative Reading of Friedrich Schlegel'sAlternating Principle ( Wechselerweis)In his review of EH.Jacobi's Woldemar, which appeared in Reichardt's journal Deutschland in I796, (KFSA 11, 70-74) Schlegel overstepped the narrow boundaries of a strict literary review and used the opportunity to characterize Jacobi's philosophy as a whole.Against the requirements of philosophical reason, which Jacobi believed necessarily succumbed to either a "consistent" dogmatism or the "mere shadows" of idealism, Jacobi had embraced a philosophy of "belief" (Glauben), of "wondrous revelation" (Offenbarung) opposed to every form of reason.According to Schlegel, Jacobi had reduced philosophy to "der in Begriffe und Worte gebrachte Geist eines Individuellen Lebens," (KFSA 11, 71) and had thereby failed to recognize the two most basic suppositions of philosophy, namely the will to truth and the striving for a systematic, scientific totality.Schlegel wrote: "Aber nur wenn Streben nach Wahrheit und Wissenschaft die Seele dieses Lebens ist, kann der Geist desselben philosophisch genannt werden."(KFSA 11, 71) As is often the case with Schlegel, there is an inherent ambiguity with regard to these two claims.It hinges on whether we place the emphasis on the "will" and "striving" or on the claim to scientific systematicity and totality.With this statement, and in the text which followed it, Schlegel began his philosophical inquiry into the status of the basic philosophical proposition (Grundsatz).The notion that philosophy must and could be grounded in one, fundamental proposition, specifically, the basic proposition of consciousness (Satz des Bewußtseins), had been advanced by Karl Leonhard Reinhold in his Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens (I789) and -in a more systematic fashion -by J.G. Fichte in the various versions of his Wissenschaftslehre, beginning in I794.Skepticism