Toward a Subjectivity-Centered Science of Consciousness

Abstract

Subjective experience is the central explanandum of consciousness science, yet subjective experiential contents (qualia) are not directly accessible as scientific data. Many existing theories attempt to identify consciousness with physical, informational, or functional properties, thereby risking the treatment of subjective experience as an objective theoretical entity. This paper proposes an alternative framework. Qualia are not introduced as theoretical concepts. Instead, theories are formulated exclusively in terms of objectively describable concepts, including Physical Correlates of Consciousness (PCCs). The primary task of a theory is not to describe qualia themselves, but to explain why particular PCCs possess the characteristic feature of subjectivity. We distinguish qualia, subjectivity, the subject, and PCCs, and derive methodological and empirical constraints on theories of consciousness. The framework emphasizes explanatory coherence over mere behavioral prediction and aims to provide a basis for scientifically investigating subjectivity while preserving the distinction between subjective experience and information.