Response to Darragh Byrne’s “Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent?”
April 15, 2016 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1142072 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Byrne's two main arguments against the author's reconciliation of physicalism and consciousness fail: the first because it turns on a third-person conception of appearance not at issue in the debate, and the second because separating metaphysics from science misunderstands the physicalist agenda. The author also concludes that his own misrepresentation thesis, like any conventional physicalism, entails eliminativism, which he rejects. |
Abstract
Abstract I begin by summarizing my view of the progression that occurred from the 1950s to the 1990s on the topic of physicalism and, in terms of this, present an overview of the reconciliation I was attempting in “Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.” I then address Byrne’s two main arguments. In the case of the first, I show that his argument turns on a third-person conception of appearance which is not the one addressed in the debates in question, and argue that functionalism is not relevant to physicalism about consciousness in the manner Byrne thinks. In the case of the second, I argue that Byrne’s attempt to prize metaphysics apart from science shows a misunderstanding of the physicalist agenda. In conclusion I indicate how my views have moved on. My misrepresentation thesis, like any form of conventional physicalism, ultimately entails eliminativism; and I reject eliminativism.