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The correlation/constitution distinction problem

Steven M Miller

Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.05mil (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that consciousness science has no empirical strategies for distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness from its neural constitution, and proposes the Jenga analogy to show why minimally sufficient neural correlates should not be the ultimate target. Contends that combined inhibition/stimulation strategies may identify some constitutive neural activities, but not the whole constitution of consciousness.

Abstract

The science of consciousness is founded on identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness. However, I have argued that science really seeks identification of the neural constitution of consciousness, and that there are no empirical strategies for distinguishing the correlates and constitution of consciousness. Here I review this correlation/constitution distinction problem, drawing on recording, inhibition, stimulation and combined inhibition/stimulation approaches. I propose the Jenga analogy to explain why the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness should not be considered the ultimate target of consciousness science. I then show how combined inhibition/stimulation strategies might identify some constitutive neural activities but not the whole constitution of consciousness. Clarifications, objections and related issues are also discussed and I propose new foundational claims for consciousness science.

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