Qualities in the World, in Science, and in Consciousness
Kristjan Loorits
Journal of Consciousness Studies December 1, 2022 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.11.108 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the illusionist claim that consciousness's apparently non-structural features are fully structural is tenable only when the non-structural 'seemings' are interpreted as perspectival phenomena, not as fictions or absolute nothingness. This perspectivist view permits ignoring sensory qualities in natural science while acknowledging their moral and philosophical importance, and explains how such qualities can be observed and discussed despite lacking autonomous causal powers. |
Abstract
It has been argued, most famously by David Chalmers, that all objects of the so-called traditional sciences (from physics to neuroscience) are analysable in structural terms, whereas consciousness has qualitative properties that are irreducibly non-structural. From that it has been concluded that consciousness cannot be explained by traditional sciences. Some illusionists have responded by proposing that the apparently non-structural features of consciousness are in fact fully structural and merely seem to be non-structural. I argue that such a position is tenable, but only if the non-structural 'seemings' are interpreted as perspectival phenomena and not as theorists' fictions or absolute nothingness. The resulting view allows us to ignore sensory qualities in the context of natural sciences while acknowledging their importance in the moral and philosophical domains. The proposed perspectivist interpretation also provides an account of how sensory qualities can be observed and talked about despite having no autonomous causal powers.