Thomas Reid e as Teorias de Ordem Superior da Consciência
Gaspar De Souza
Revista Ágora Filosófica February 10, 2023 DOI: 10.25247/p1982-999x.2023.v23n2.p62-75 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Thomas Reid's theory of consciousness can be read as compatible with contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness without compromising Reid's system of direct realism, positioning this view within the debate between Copenhaver (2007) and Thiel (2010). |
Abstract
It is unquestionable to have a theory of consciousness in Thomas Reid (1710 - 1796). However, at least two antagonistic positions are presented to describe this theory. Is Reid's theory of consciousness different from contemporary higher order theories, as Rebecca Copenhaver (2007) argues? Or would Reid agree with the "higher order theory", as Udo Thiel (2010) thinks? In this article I will outline something of Reid's theory of consciousness that would possibly lead Thomas Reid to agree with higher order theories without compromising his system of direct realism. For this purpose, we will develop the article as follows: (1) Introduction to the debate and discussions about higher-order theories of consciousness; (2) a presentation of Thomas Reid's theory of consciousness; (3) conclusion. We will appropriate the analysis of concepts on the subject and on Reid's thought.