Imagery in action. G. H. Mead’s contribution to sensorimotor enactivism

Abstract

AbstractThe aim of the article is to outline several valuable elements of Mead’s pragmatist theory of perception in action developed in hisThe Philosophy of the Act(1938), in order to strengthen the pragmatist legacy of the enactivist approach. In particular, Mead’s theory of perception in action turns out to be a forerunner of sensorimotor enactivist theory. Unlike the latter, however, Mead explicitly refers to imagery as an essential capacity for agency. Nonetheless, the article argues that the ways in which Mead refers to this capacity do not necessarily place it in opposition to enactivist non-representationalism. On the contrary, as a synthetic process ofre-presentingof present and past sensorimotor elements, imagery can be seen as the hallmark of a pragmatically inspired sensorimotor enactivist approach that bypasses the opposition between representationalists and non-representationalists.