Hidden Differences in Phenomenal Experience
Gary Lupyan, Ryutaro Uchiyama, Bill Thompson, Daniel Casasanto
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that hidden phenomenal differences, such as variation in visual imagery, are widespread and often overlooked because people assume others share their experiences. Proposes that studying these differences can uncover unknown unknowns, predict puzzling behavioral variation, stress-test cognitive theories, and reveal how environments mask or unmask links between phenomenal experience and observable behavior. |
Abstract
In addition to the many easily observable differences between people, there are also differences in people’s subjective experiences that are harder to observe, and which, as a consequence, remain hidden. For example, people vary widely in how much visual imagery they experience. But those who cannot see in their mind’s eye, tend to assume everyone is like them. Those who can, assume everyone else can as well. We argue that a study of such hidden phenomenal differences has much to teach cognitive science. Uncovering and describing this variation (a search for unknown unknowns) may help predict otherwise puzzling differences in human behavior. The very existence of certain differences can also act as a stress test for some cognitive theories. Finally, studying hidden phenomenal differences is the first step toward understanding what kinds of environments may mask or unmask links between phenomenal experience and observable behavior.