Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness
Mark Textor
Canadian Journal of Philosophy July 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.48 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Lotze's Argument from Comparison does not deliver a simple thinker but makes a good case for consciousness as an indivisible unity. The paper reconstructs and evaluates the argument, relates it to the contemporary top-down versus bottom-up debate on the unity of consciousness, and situates it historically with Kant and Herbart. |
Abstract
AbstractHermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously “holds objects together as well as apart” such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity.’ I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)