Was bedeutet Alexithymie für die Erforschung von Emotionen und Bewusstsein?
Sara Dellantonio, Luigi Pastore
September 4, 2023 DOI: 10.30965/9783969752920_007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that alexithymia shows a purely cognitive account of emotions to be implausible, since feelings are needed to identify, recognize, and label emotions, and that such labeling cannot rely only on coarse bodily-state feelings. Proposes that emotional feelings are second-order feelings formed by blending and integrating feelings derived from bodily states, and that access consciousness can depend on phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
Alexithymia is a sub-clinical condition characterized by impaired awareness of emotions. People suffering from alexithymia are not able to identify, conceptualize and thus verbalize their emotions; in emotionally salient situations they perceive bodily states instead of emotions. On the basis of an analysis of alexithymia, we argue that a purely cognitive perspective on emotions is implausible and that feelings are needed in order to identify, recognize, and label our emotions. We also point out that identification, recognition, and labeling of our emotions cannot rely solely on rough feelings related to our bodily states. This supports the view that emotional feelings are second order feelings obtained by processing – by blending and integrating – feelings derived from our bodily states. Moreover, the case of alexithymia shows that – at least in certain cases – our access consciousness depends on phenomenal consciousness, i.e., on the qualitative and introspectively accessible aspects of our experience.