From mechanisms to meanings: toward a content-sensitive psychiatry
Lucas Ferrer Nappe
Frontiers in Psychiatry March 6, 2026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2026.1742330 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that neurobiological frameworks such as Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information Theory, and predictive processing account for the mechanisms of conscious access, integration, and inference but not for what is experienced or what it means to a person. Using examples of matched autonomic arousal (thrill versus dread) and identical nociceptive input (relief versus suffering), the authors contend that mechanisms are necessary but meanings should steer clinical care. |
Abstract
Neurobiological advances-from Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) to predictive processing-have transformed how we model conscious access, integration, and inference. These frameworks primarily explain capacities and mechanisms (how information becomes globally available, is integrated, or is prediction-driven), not what is experienced in a situation nor what it means for a person. Clinically, this gap appears when matched autonomic arousal is thrill on a rollercoaster but dread during trauma recall, or when identical nociceptive input is relief in one frame and suffering in another. Mechanisms are necessary; meanings steer care.