THE COMPUTATIONAL TRIAD: CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA, AND AGENCY IN IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS
Rafael Almeida Reis
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) February 11, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18612865 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness, qualia, and free will are three aspects of a single phenomenon: computationally irreducible processing in self-modeling systems. Proposes that phenomenal consciousness arises when a system integrates heterogeneous information under computational irreducibility, that qualia are the necessary representational format for this integration, and that free will emerges from irreducible self-modeling deliberation. The framework predicts consciousness admits of degrees based on computational complexity, self-model sophistication, and integration capacity. |
Abstract
Consciousness, qualia, and free will are standardly treated as three separate problems requiring distinct explanatory frameworks. This paper proposes that they are, instead, three aspects of a single phenomenon: computationally irreducible processing in self-modeling systems. Building on Wolfram's classification of computational systems, Azadi's formal proof connecting autonomy to computational irreducibility, and recent empirical evidence from the COGITATE adversarial collaboration and perturbational complexity research, we develop a unified account in which (i) phenomenal consciousness arises when a system must integrate heterogeneous information under conditions of computational irreducibility, (ii) qualia constitute the necessary representational format for such integration, and (iii) free will emerges as a natural consequence of irreducible self-modeling deliberation. The framework predicts that consciousness admits of degrees, defined by a system's computational complexity, self-model sophistication, and integration capacity. We address the principal objections to computational accounts of consciousness — including the simulation-versus-execution challenge posed by recent Integrated Information Theory analyses — and outline a program of falsifiable empirical predictions. The resulting picture positions consciousness not as an anomaly requiring special explanation, but as an expected feature of sufficiently complex computational systems operating in regimes of genuine irreducibility.