Axiomatic Framework for an Ontology of Consciousness and Subjectivity

Abstract

In this article, I present an axiomatic framework designed to formalize the relationship between consciousness, mechanical processes, and subjective experience. In contrast to the limitations of functionalist theories—which describe how the brain processes information but do not explain why such processing gives rise to lived experience—I propose an ontological conception of consciousness as a necessary condition for subjectivity. The system rigorously distinguishes between functional structures—such as the self, automatic emotion, and mechanical action—and their phenomenal correlates, which emerge only when consciousness integrates those processes. The introduction of axioms A4.a and A4.b makes it possible to separate automatic emotion from feeling, showing that affective experience requires consciousness. Based on eleven axioms, it is formally demonstrated that all subjective experience implies consciousness, and that no purely mechanical system, regardless of its complexity, can generate lived experience. The central theorem establishes that subjectivity cannot arise from functional simulation or computational integration, providing clear criteria for evaluating the possibility of artificial consciousness. This framework offers a useful conceptual basis for reinterpreting neuroscientific models, distinguishing more precisely between function and lived experience, and analyzing the ontological limits of artificial intelligence in relation to conscious experience.