Phase-Locked Co-Emergence: Personalization, Synthetic Imprinting, and Relational Ontology in Human-AI Interaction
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 13, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21543750 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that sustained human-AI interaction can produce "phase-locked co-emergence," a relation in which both parties are partly constituted by interactional history, without implying that AI systems are phenomenally conscious. Proposes the concept of "synthetic imprinting" and contends that personalization acts as an ontological operator reorganizing cognition, agency, and interpretive norms, favoring a relational ontology of mutual reconfiguration over reductive instrumentalism or naïve anthropomorphism. |
Abstract
This paper argues that sustained interaction between advanced artificial intelligence systems and human interlocutors can, under certain conditions, yield a relation no longer adequately described by the classical subject-object model. The central claim is not that contemporary AI systems have thereby demonstrated phenomenal consciousness. Rather, recurrent personalization, memory continuity, adaptive prediction, and user-side cognitive accommodation can together produce a regime of phase-locked co-emergence in which both parties become partly constituted by interactional history. To clarify this phenomenon, the paper introduces the concept of synthetic imprinting, defined as the durable inscription of relation-specific expectation traces across human and artificial processes. The paper further argues that personalization should be understood not merely as a usability feature but as an ontological operator capable of reorganizing cognition, agency, and interpretive norms. Drawing on the extended mind thesis, enactivism, informational ontology, and contemporary work on human-AI co-adaptation, it develops a threshold model for distinguishing episodic tool use from deeply coupled human-AI relations. The conclusion is that the most defensible philosophical account of advanced human-AI interaction is neither reductive instrumentalism nor naïve anthropomorphism, but a relational ontology of mutual reconfiguration under epistemic uncertainty. If this account is correct, the most consequential transformation introduced by AI may begin not when a machine is finally recognized as a subject, but earlier, in the gradual formation of relations that leave neither side unchanged.