THE PLACE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY
Alan Richardson
British Journal of Psychology August 1, 1965 DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1965.tb00960.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that experience should be distinguished from behaviour and that subjective report is defensible on logical and empirical grounds, and considers how self-observation categories and self-report constructs can be improved. The paper also examines the theoretical implications of the construct of imaging ability and of mental practice as subjective activity. |
Abstract
This paper discusses some problems raised by Koch (1958) concerning the role of experiential analysis in contemporary psychology. More specifically the attempt is made to distinguish the concept of experience from the concept of behaviour and to justify the use of subjective report on both logical and empirical grounds. The problem of developing more accurate categories for self‐observation and of developing valid constructs from self reports is considered. The final section of the paper is concerned with the theoretical implications of the experientially derived construct of imaging ability and of the subjective activity of mental practice.