Dennett: Content and Consciousness
Thomas Nagel
July 27, 1995 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195090086.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key findings | The reviewer concludes that the book is valuable and interesting but does not solve the mind-body problem. The reviewer recounts Dennett's argument that the identity theory seems plausible mainly because the alternatives are unpalatable, and that avoiding dualism and behaviorism appears to lead to a neural identity theory. |
Abstract
Abstract Although it does not solve the mind-body problem, this is a valuable and interesting book. Dennett begins with the accurate observation that no one would find the identity theory plausible if it were not for the unpalatability of the alternatives. As he puts it, the motive for identification is to avoid antic bulge. If there really are mental phenomena, they must be either identical or nonidentical with physical phenomena. If dualism is to be avoided, and if behaviorism is not a viable way of avoiding it, one seems to be thrown into the arms of a neural identity theory.