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The Stuff of Dreams

Stephen LaBerge

Anthropology of Consciousness September 1, 1994 DOI: 10.1525/ac.1994.5.3.28 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that dreaming uses the same perceptual and mental processes as waking cognition, with the sleeping brain relying predominantly on internal information to simulate the world. Proposes that perception is dreaming constrained by sensory input, whereas dreaming is perception free of sensory input and external constraints. Presents data indicating that dreaming and waking experience are less distinct than often assumed, while dreaming exhibits a wider range of consciousness qualities.

Abstract

A model of dreaming is developed along the following lines: A primary function of the brain is to predict and control environmental events. In order to do so, it constructs a model of the world. The waking brain bases its model primarily on current sensory information, and secondarily on contextual and historical information. In contrast, because the sleeping brain acquires little information from the senses, sources of information that are secondary in the waking state become predominant in the sleeping state. I believe dreams result from the sleeping brain using internal information (memories, expectations, fears, desires, etc.) to create a simulation of the world. According to this theory, dreaming is the result of the same perceptual and mental processes that we use to comprehend the world when awake. From this perspective, to perceive is to dream, or more precisely, perception is dreaming constrained by sensory information; dreaming is perception independent of sensory input, and thus external constraints. Data is presented indicating that typical dreaming and waking experience are less distinct than often assumed, but that dreaming exhibits a wider range of qualities of consciousness than the normal waking state.