The mind/brain inequality.
Bio Systems 2001 DOI: 10.1016/s0303-2647(01)00155-1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness can be represented as a mental state vector in a multidimensional space, with a 'bridging principle' linking vector direction to neuronal depolarization probability. The formalism yields a 'mind/brain inequality' limiting objective access to subjective information and predicts non-local neural correlations testable experimentally, suggesting a role for consciousness in perceptual binding. |
Abstract
A unified consciousness may be resolved into multiple perceptual and conceptual components. This suggests that it might be useful to represent experience as a vector in a multi-dimensional space (the 'mental state vector'). If it is supposed that a single neuron alone supports minimal consciousness, that vector would exist in a space of minimal dimension. The direction of the vector might then describe both the content of consciousness and the probability of neuronal depolarisation (the 'bridging principle'). I will outline a mathematical formalism that generalises this description to multiple neurons (and multiple dimensions), while preserving unity. This formalism implies that objective access to subjective information is limited, expressed as the 'mind/brain inequality'. The formalism also predicts a correlation of neural activity between remote anatomic sites that is inconsistent with a purely local model of neuronal signalling (Physics 1 (1964) 195). This prediction allows experimental test of the scheme and suggests a role for consciousness in the 'binding' (Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 5 (1995) 520) of perception.