Intelligence without Experience: Autopoietic Agency and the Organizational Conditions of Consciousness
Derecom September 5, 2026 DOI: 10.5209/dere.107663 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Artificial intelligence Consciousness Agency Autopoiesis Subjective experience Organizational closure |
| Key points | Argues that intelligence, agency, and consciousness are distinct phenomena, and that autopoietic organization explains adaptive capacities without subjective experience, which requires further organizational conditions. |
Abstract
Recent advances in artificial intelligence have reignited the debate over whether artificial systems may eventually develop consciousness. This paper challenges the assumption that intelligence, agency, and consciousness constitute successive stages along a single developmental continuum, arguing instead that they are conceptually distinct phenomena. Drawing on Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis, it is argued that adaptive self-maintaining organization is sufficient to explain capacities such as learning, adaptation, and goal-directed behavior without presupposing subjective experience. The paper further proposes that consciousness requires additional organizational conditions beyond those underlying intelligence and agency. By distinguishing subjective experience from adaptive functionality, this framework provides a more rigorous basis for assessing claims about machine consciousness and their ethical and governance implications.