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The visual unconscious

Dominic H Ffytche

Advances in Consciousness Research October 28, 2010 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.79.27ffy (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Charles Bonnet Syndrome reveals a visual unconscious—a hidden system of modular processing—that underlies conscious visual experience and has functions yet unrecognized by visual science.

Abstract

Neurobiological accounts of consciousness typically partition brain activity into two components: one correlated with conscious experience (the neural correlate of consciousness) and the other not. Here I use evidence derived from visual hallucinations in the context of eye disease – the Charles Bonnet Syndrome – to examine the nature of what might be termed the visual unconscious. Forcing us to reconsider the nature of the unconscious, this hidden system of modular processing underlies our apparently seamless conscious visual experience of the world with many of its complex functions yet to be recognised by visual science.