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Neurodynamics of mind: the arrow illusion of conscious intentionality as downward causation.

Joaquín Barutta, Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht, Carlos Cornejo, Agustin Ibanez

Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science June 2010 DOI: 10.1007/s12124-010-9117-8 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that the emergence and downward causation model of consciousness is inconsistent and proposes a contextual and pragmatic alternative for understanding how consciousness influences neural processes.

Abstract

In cognitive neuroscience, the reissue of the notion of emergence and downward causation has been used as an interlevel model of mind-brain interactions from different perspectives. Within this perspective, intentionality has been interpreted as global to local determination (downward causation) on the neurophysiological level. Consciousness would act as the large-scale, global activity of the system that governs or constrains local interactions of neurons. This argument seems to solve several difficulties with regard to descriptions of consciousness on a neurophysiological and mental level. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies of this argument are shown, and a contextual and pragmatic explanation of the downward causation of consciousness is given.

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