Enactivism & Social Cognition: In Search of the Whole Story
Leon De Bruin, Sanneke De Haan
Cognitive Semiotics April 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1515/cogsem.2009.4.1.225 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Argues that narrative-based proposals by Gallagher and Hutto are difficult to see as continuous with the enactivist notion of direct coupling, and that the enactive approach should adopt a broader notion of coupling to account for folk psychological action interpretation. |
Abstract
Abstract Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is difficult to see them as continuous with the enactivist notion of direct coupling, and (ii) the failure to account for folk psychological action interpretation suggests that the enactive approach should adopt a broader notion of coupling.