What Is It Like to Be a Bot?
Journal of Consciousness Studies June 1, 2026 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.33.5.031 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that non-reductive functionalism violates principles that dispositional and convention-dependent properties lack causal relevance, and that Chalmers' dancing qualia and fading qualia arguments each rely on at least one implausible premise. |
Abstract
Non-reductive functionalism holds that qualia are distinct, non-physical properties that are caused by functional properties. This view violates the plausible principles that (i) mere dispositional properties lack independent causal relevance, and (ii) convention-dependent properties lack causal relevance. David Chalmers’ main arguments for the view rest on his dancing qualia and fading qualia thought experiments. But in each argument, at least one of two premises is implausible, depending on whether we take qualia to be epiphenomenal or not.