Mindscape Collective is now The Consciousness Library. Same library, new name. You may need to sign in again. About the change
Skip to content

Félix Varela and the Hermeneutics of the Observer: An Epistemological Reinterpretation of Inner Freedom

Alexander Lázaro Gómez González

PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) February 28, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18818939 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

This article proposes a contemporary reinterpretation of Félix Varela through the Hermeneutics of the Observer (HO), an epistemological theory describing the human subject's dynamic structure via perception, perspective, point of view, opinion, and feedback. It argues that Varela, though not formalizing a theory of consciousness, anticipated inner freedom as a process of judgment formation and transformation of consciousness. HO formalizes this intuition, presenting inner freedom as an epistemological phenomenon grounded in interpretive autonomy. Integrating Megan Entwistle's concept of Perspectival Forgetting, the article shows convergence between Cuban philosophical tradition and current debates on memory, subjectivity, and experience. It concludes that HO completes and projects Varela's thought toward a contemporary theory of subjectivity.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Reinterpretation Hermeneutics Phenomenon Subject documents Perspective graphical
Key finding Argues that the Hermeneutics of the Observer formalizes Varela's implicit understanding of inner freedom as interpretive autonomy, completing his thought toward a contemporary theory of subjectivity.

Abstract

This article proposes a contemporary reinterpretation of Félix Varela through the lens of the Hermeneutics of the Observer (HO), an epistemological theory that describes the dynamic structure of the human subject through an interpretive sequence composed of perception, perspective, point of view, opinion, and feedback. It argues that although Varela did not formalize a theory of consciousness, he anticipated a profound understanding of inner freedom as a process of judgment formation and transformation of consciousness. HO provides the conceptual framework that formalizes this intuition, showing that inner freedom is an epistemological phenomenon grounded in interpretive autonomy. The article also integrates the contemporary concept of Perspectival Forgetting, developed by Megan Entwistle, demonstrating the convergence between the Cuban philosophical tradition and current debates on memory, subjectivity, and experience. It concludes that HO does not replace Varela but completes and projects his thought toward a contemporary theory of subjectivity.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment