Spinoza and Bergson Through and Beyond Deleuze: Freedom as Undissociated Joy
Philosophies June 29, 2026 DOI: 10.3390/philosophies11040109 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis philosophical analysis examines how Deleuze, Spinoza, and Bergson each affirm a form of metaphysical incompatibilism regarding freedom. The author argues that Spinoza and Bergson remain incompatible despite Deleuze's attempts to synthesize them, and that all three thinkers treat the coexistence of incompatible elements—such as necessity and freedom—as constitutive of life, consciousness, and freedom. Deleuze's radical pluralism rejects reconciliation in favor of an expanding multiplicity of incompatibilities. The author highlights overlooked parallels between Spinoza and Bergson, notably a shared moral notion of freedom expressed as intellectual generosity or "undissociated joy," and proposes Jean-Marie Guyau as an alternative link to Bergsonism through his spiritualist Spinozism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Metaphysics Teleology Incompatibilism Value mathematics Determinism |
| Key finding | Argues that Spinoza, Bergson, and Deleuze all affirm a version of metaphysical incompatibilism, with Deleuze's radical pluralism rejecting reconciliation in favor of an expanding multiplicity of incompatibilities. |
Abstract
Two related problems, problems of (in-)compatibility, are addressed to understand Deleuze’s philosophical project and to deepen our understanding of his use of Spinoza and Bergson: that of the compatible and incompatible features of Spinozism and Bergsonism, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the status of metaphysical compatibilism with respect to freedom in all three of their philosophies. I trace the incompatibilities and insist on the value of reopening the problem partially covered up by Deleuze’s creative engagement. Spinoza and Bergson remain incompatible despite Deleuze’s mixture, and metaphysically, Bergson and Deleuze explicitly affirm the coexistence of incompatible ingredients as constitutive of our very existence and freedom. Some version of metaphysical incompatibilism is affirmed by all three. Life, consciousness, and freedom force us to think of an irreducible incompatibility as constitutive, the coexistence of necessity and freedom, on the one hand, and a movement beyond teleology and mechanism, on the other. Deleuze’s radical pluralism rejects the value of reconciliation and instead deploys an expanding multiplicity of incompatibilities. I flag certain parallels and resonances between Spinoza and Bergson that are not common Deleuzian themes and suggest that Jean-Marie Guyau provides an alternative link to Bergsonism through his spiritualist Spinozism. Despite Bergson’s criticisms of Spinoza, they shared a moral notion of freedom expressed in intellectual generosity, which I characterize as undissociated joy.