Using Spinoza to Address Experiences of Selfhood within Existential Anxiety and Self-Referential Processing in Depersonalization-Derealization

Existential anxiety in depersonalization-derealization disorder appears both as a symptom to be reduced and as a window into self-referential processes. This argument combines Spinoza's concept of conatus—the striving to persist—with insights from lived experience to better understand how people distinguish themselves amid environmental demands. The proposed conceptualization of conatus aligns with current findings and may inform clinical recommendations and future research into the neurophenomenology of dissociative disorders.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Presentations of existential anxiety within depersonalization-derealization disorder both present as symptoms to be reduced and highlight a particular trend for understanding self-referential processes. In offering a possible neurophenomenological conceptualization of how oneself attempts to understand oneself through the course of experiencing existential anxiety, a lens through Spinoza’s conatus may offer insight. This argument seeks to combine Spinoza’s conatus with insights from lived experience in an attempt to better understand the nature of self-referential processes, how one distinguishes who they are as a person amidst the demands of the environment around them. This argument will present a conceptualization of how conatus functions that aligns with the current findings and can be used to inform clinical recommendations and future research into the neurophenomenological program and dissociative disorders as a whole.