What zombies can't do: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness
March 22, 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0013 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the psychological zombie hypothesis suggests conscious awareness is not necessary for mental operations typically accompanied by it, thereby challenging the causal role of consciousness. |
Abstract
Could an individual act and speak just like other individuals without having any internal conscious experience? Belief in the possibility of so-called philosophical zombies serves as a litmus test for whether someone believes in some form of mind-body dualism or materialism. This chapter focuses on a related hypothesis that is emerging within psychology referred to as the psychological zombie hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that our behaviors and judgements are produced by an 'inner-zombie' whose mental work does not depend on conscious awareness, and that those mental operations which are typically accompanied by conscious awareness do not rely on awareness to generate the operations and their outputs. This hypothesis suggests that mental operations which are typically accompanied by conscious awareness can be produced in the absence of conscious awareness, thus demonstrating the superfluousness of awareness.