Conceptual Limits of the Basic Strategies for Understanding the Nature of Artificial Intelligence: Through the Prism of Imaginary Experiments

This article offers a socio-philosophical analysis of major directions in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, including physicalism, functionalism, and cognitive pluralism. The authors examine thought experiments such as "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", "Chinese Room", "Swampman", "Chinese Nation", and "Philosophical Zombies" to illustrate limitations of reductionist approaches to consciousness. They focus on the problem of "qualia" and the fundamental distinction between syntax and semantics in AI operations. The paper argues for a transition to a transdisciplinary paradigm combining natural science and socio-humanitarian knowledge to understand intelligence and prospects for creating "strong" AI.

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Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive socio‒philosophical analysis of the main directions in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI), such as physicalism, functionalism, and cognitive pluralism. The authors examine key thought experiments (“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?ˮ, © Дзьобань О.П., Жушман М.В. 2026 “Chinese Roomˮ, “Swampmanˮ, “Chinese Nationˮ, and “Philosophical Zombiesˮ) that demonstrate the limitations of purely technical and reductionist approaches to understanding consciousness. Special attention is paid to the problem of “qualiaˮ and the fundamental distinction between syntax and semantics in AI operations. The paper substantiates the need for a transition to a transdisciplinary paradigm that combines natural science and socio‒humanitarian knowledge for a deep understanding of the nature of intelligence and the prospects for creating “strongˮ AI.