The ‘First Prior’: from Co-Embodiment to Co-Homeostasis in Early Life
Anna Ciaunica, Axel Constant, H. Preissl, A. Fotopoulou
Consciousness and Cognition January 5, 2021 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/twubr (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper argues that the development of a minimal sense of self begins before birth, within the womb, through the processes of co-embodiment and co-homeostasis with the gestating parent. The authors contend that this prenatal period is a crucial, yet overlooked, aspect of the Predictive Processing and Active Inference framework, which holds that perceptions are shaped by prior experiences. They propose that the universal human experience of being carried and growing within another body fundamentally shapes the emergence of minimal selfhood and has implications for debates on consciousness, the self, and social cognition.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Medicine Philosophy |
| Key finding | Proposes that minimal selfhood develops in utero through co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, a process foundational to Predictive Processing accounts of perception and consciousness. |
Abstract
The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP approaches is that human organisms first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person’s body is universal. Specifically, we focus on the development of minimal selfhood in utero as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship. We conclude with some implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self and social cognition.