Does panpsychism entail anti-realism? The worm in the panpsychist apple
Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion September 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1017/s0034412525100942 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPanpsychism holds that the structures of the world are realized by the experiences of subjects, but typically assumes those structures are observer-independent and often spatial. This assumption, described as the 'worm in the apple', underlies two major problems for panpsychism: the subject (de)combination problem and a newly identified 'inner-outer gap problem'. The author argues that abandoning this assumption sidesteps both problems, but doing so commits panpsychism to anti-realism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that the realist assumption of observer-independent spatial structures in panpsychism underlies the subject combination problem and the inner-outer gap problem, and that abandoning it leads to anti-realism. |
Abstract
Abstract Panpsychists commonly hang onto the ‘realist’ assumption that our world with its structures has an observer-independent, often spatial element to it, even while they claim that those structures are realized by the experiences of subjects. I argue that this assumption is the ‘worm in the apple’ that lurks behind two of panpsychism’s major problems: the subject (de)combination problem and what I call the ‘inner-outer gap problem’. Abandoning this assumption sidesteps those problems, but commits panpsychism to anti-realism.