Panentheism, Panpsychism, Theism

Abstract

Abstract This chapter addresses a key element of Abhinavagupta’s panentheism: the question of how we get sentience, through looking at the possibilities for computer sentience, machine AI, and specifically Nick Bostrom’s discussion of a paperclip apocalypse. Abhinavagupta locates the essence of sentience in the term vimarśa. I suggest Abhinavagupta’s use of the term vimarśa more closely approximates what contemporary neuroscientists and philosophers, such as Anil Seth and John Searle, understand as consciousness, rather than the terms that are ubiquitously used to translate the notion of consciousness from Indian languages to English, like cit, citi, or saṃvid. This chapter argues that Abhinavagupta affords priority to vimarśa precisely because of its links to activity, a capacity to do things in our material reality. Employing a dual-aspect monism, his formulation parses out a key distinction for his panentheism, but also for a contemporary panpsychism and for New Materialism: the idea of consciousness as a fabric of reality in relation to awareness as a first-person perspective. This entails a pervasive subjectivity, even within matter.