Essere un soggetto è un fenomeno naturale?
Rivista di Estetica January 30, 2019 DOI: 10.4000/estetica.1693 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes but defensible for low-level phenomenal states, grounding subjectivity in biology. |
Abstract
As I define it, metaphysical naturalism (in the philosophy of mind) is the thesis according to which mental facts supervene in strong sense on neurophysiological states, i.e., the former can be deduced from the latter. In this paper I discuss this thesis by taking into consideration two different kinds of mental states: I shall argue that, while metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires), it can be defended in the case of low-level phenomenal states, or raw feelings. As a consequence, since the instantiation of high-order mental states requires those neurophysiological mechanisms that constitute raw feelings, the notion of self has a biological basis, and to this extent we can regard subjectivity as a natural phenomenon.