From P-Zombies to Substance Dualism

Philosophical zombies (p-zombies) are beings physically identical to humans but lacking subjective conscious experience. If p-zombies or inverted qualia (where two people have identical physical states but different color experiences) are possible, this is typically taken to support property dualism—the view that consciousness is not reducible to physical states. This article argues that if such scenarios are actually possible, they entail more radical conclusions than previously thought: either substance dualism (mind and body are separate substances), stronger reasons to reject p-zombies and inverted qualia, eliminativism about selves, or a need for defenders to show a disanalogy between traditional arguments and new ones that lead to substance dualism. The author does not defend any option but presents these four possibilities.

Study at a glance

Abstract

P-zombies are creatures that are physically (functionally, behaviourally) like you and I and yet lack phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are possible, it’s (typically) taken to show property dualism is true: phenomenal consciousness isn’t reducible to – nor does it supervene on – physical states. If inverted qualia are possible, it’s possible that you and I have identical physical states and yet you see tomatoes as green and I see tomatoes as red. If this is the case, then (again) property dualism is (typically) taken to be true. In this article, I???ll show that p-zombies and inverted qualia – if they are actually possible – prove more than previously thought: if one thinks p-zombies or inverted qualia are possible, then one should endorse one of the four following theses: (i) substance dualism, (ii) we have even more reason to reject p-zombies and inverted qualia since they entail an even more radical conclusion than previously thought (i.e. substance dualism), (iii) eliminativism about selves, or (iv) friends of p-zombies and inverted qualia have homework: they need to show a relevant, plausible disanalogy between arguments for p-zombies and inverted qualia as traditionally stated and my parallel arguments that entail substance dualism. My purpose here isn’t to defend any of these particular options. Instead, my purpose is to highlight that these are the four options available to take.