What Can Space-time Emergence Teach Us About Consciousness?

Abstract

Schneider and Bailey's 'Superpsychism' advances the prototime interpretation of quantum mechanics, on which entanglement unfolds in a non-spatio-temporal arena. By locating maximal consciousness at this fundamental level, they aim to gain leverage over both physicalism and cosmopsychism. I argue, however, that the view encounters two issues. First, if the fundamental level is nonspatio-temporal, our conception of the physical becomes unstable. At best one could redescribe what remains as a thin negative gap, but even that residual puzzle carries little dialectical force, reflecting ignorance rather than any principled contrast. Second, the contrast between superpsychism and cosmopsychism cannot rely on scale once space-time is set aside; recast mereologically, it shows no clear advantage for superpsychism, and in fact risks collapsing into cosmopsychism unless further argument is supplied. The broader lesson is that the prototime framework points more generally, and at least prima facie, toward non-spatio-temporal monism, while leaving open the task of showing whether and why superpsychism should be preferred within the family of monist views.