Fractionating the unitary notion of dissociation: disembodied but not embodied dissociative experiences are associated with exocentric perspective-taking.

People who have had out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are more efficient at taking an external, third-person perspective on a novel perspective-taking task compared to people who have not had OBEs. They also report significantly higher levels of derealization—feeling alienated from their surroundings—but not higher levels of other anomalous body experiences, emotional numbing, or sensory recall anomalies. These results support a distinction between embodied dissociative experiences (like feeling unreal) and disembodied ones (like OBEs), with only the latter linked to enhanced exocentric perspective-taking. The findings suggest that OBEs may reflect a facilitated ability to adopt an external viewpoint, rather than a deficit.

Study at a glance

Abstract

It has been argued that hallucinations which appear to involve shifts in egocentric perspective (e.g., the out-of-body experience, OBE) reflect specific biases in exocentric perspective-taking processes. Via a newly devised perspective-taking task, we examined whether such biases in perspective-taking were present in relation to specific dissociative anomalous body experiences (ABE) - namely the OBE. Participants also completed the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000) which provided measures of additional embodied ABE (unreality of self) and measures of derealization (unreality of surroundings). There were no reliable differences in the level of ABE, emotional numbing, and anomalies in sensory recall reported between the OBE and control group as measured by the corresponding CDS subscales. In contrast, the OBE group did provide significantly elevated measures of derealization ("alienation from surroundings" CDS subscale) relative to the control group. At the same time we also found that the OBE group was significantly more efficient at completing all aspects of the perspective-taking task relative to controls. Collectively, the current findings support fractionating the typically unitary notion of dissociation by proposing a distinction between embodied dissociative experiences and disembodied dissociative experiences - with only the latter being associated with exocentric perspective-taking mechanisms. Our findings - obtained with an ecologically valid task and a homogeneous OBE group - also call for a re-evaluation of the relationship between OBEs and perspective-taking in terms of facilitated disembodied experiences.