Flow state in psychology and neuroscience: current research and issues
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSince the 1970s, flow state has been extensively studied, but inconsistencies in its definition and measurement hinder a unified understanding. Disagreements exist over whether flow is discrete or continuous, and whether it should be measured through its characteristics and conditions or as a separate concept. Various neurocognitive theories propose mechanisms like reduced frontal activity, synchronization of attention and reward, or sequential cognitive reorganization. Empirical evidence indicates that flow involves increased activity in reward and attentional systems, along with decreased self-monitoring. However, conceptual issues prevent clear connections between empirical findings and specific theories.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Review |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Conceptualization issues prevent unambiguous linking of empirical findings with different neurocognitive theories of flow. |
Abstract
Since Csikszentmihalyi first conceptualised flow state in 1975, extensive studies filled the scientific literature on the topic. However, inconsistencies in how flow has been conceptualised and operationalised make it difficult to present a unified account. Deviations include whether to operationalise flow as discrete or continuous and whether to measure flow through characteristics and conditions which elicit it or as a distinct concept independent from these antecedents. Different neurocognitive theories have been proposed, such as hypofrontal de-activation, attention-reward synchronisation and sequential cognitive reorganisation. Empirical studies suggest that states of flow involve increased activity in motivational systems related with reward and increased activity in task engagement and attentional networks, alongside reduced activity in self-monitoring networks. However, conceptualisation issues prevent from unambiguously linking empirical findings with different theories.