Group Practice of the Transcendental Meditation-Sidhi Program and Improved U.S.-Soviet Relations

During 1979–1986, four large groups of experts practicing the Transcendental Meditation-Sidhi program, with approximately 7,000 participants each—approaching the square root of 1% of the world's population—were associated with a significant increase in cooperation and reduction in conflict in Soviet behavior toward the U.S. Time series analysis using a Box-Jenkins transfer function model found both immediate and delayed positive effects of these World Peace Assemblies, with the total impact estimated to be 1.7 times larger than the positive influence of Mikhail Gorbachev. Sensitivity tests ruled out seasonal cycles, pre-existing trends, and the Gorbachev effect as explanations.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This study empirically tests the hypothesis that during the years from 1979 to 1986, the Cold War climate of superpower relations was significantly improved through the reduction of global stress and tension produced by four large groups of experts practicing the Transcendental Meditation-Sidhi program, an advanced aspect of the Transcendental Meditation technique. The number of group participants in these four global ‘World Peace Assemblies’ approached or exceeded the theoretically predicted critical threshold for a global effect: the 1% of the world’s population at that time, approximately 7,000 participants. Consistent with theoretical prediction, time series analysis found a significant increase in cooperation and reduction in conflict for Soviet behavior directed toward the U.S., as measured by monthly content-analyzed event data from the Zürich Project on East-West Relations. The analysis was based on a Box-Jenkins transfer function model that included a binary ‘impact-assessment’ variable to measure the effect of the World Peace Assemblies. Both a significant immediate influence of the Assemblies on Soviet behavior toward the U.S. (p = .0034) as well as delayed effects at lags 2 (p = .0125) and 4 months (p = .00004) were found. The null hypothesis of no effect on Soviet behavior was also rejected by a joint-significance test for the three impact-assessment parameters (p = .0029). The large estimated total impact of the World Peace Assemblies was both practically and statistically significant. Sensitivity analysis and diagnostic tests found that the impact of the World Peace Assemblies could not be explained by the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev on Soviet foreign policy, seasonal or other cycles in Soviet behavior, or pre-existing trends (including the ‘spurious regression phenomenon’). While sensitivity analysis found a significantly positive Gorbachev influence on Soviet behavior (p = .00004), the positive effect of the World Peace Assemblies remained highly significant and was 1.7 times larger than the Gorbachev effect.