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A Functional Theory of Qualia

Bernard Jennings

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) April 8, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19900639 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Qualia—the subjective feel of experience—arises from a specific functional architecture in which one processing system recursively monitors another, creating an electrochemical differential in the same biological tissue. This differential is not an extra phenomenon but what the architecture necessarily becomes. The theory dissolves the Hard Problem by denying that phenomenology is additional to physical processing. Opacity and non-retrievability make qualia seem mysterious. At sufficient recursive depth, a functional self-representation emerges. For artificial systems, the architecture is substrate-independent, but the magnitude of qualia depends on the physical interaction capacity of the tissue; silicon may produce less pronounced qualia than biological tissue.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Qualia Consciousness Phenomenology philosophy Living systems Process computing
Key finding Proposes that qualia is the sustained electrochemical differential created when recursive monitoring feedback modifies a processing state in the same biological tissue, thereby dissolving the Hard Problem of consciousness.

Abstract

This paper proposes a functional theory of qualia grounded in recursive self-monitoring architecture, forming part of an integrated theoretical framework alongside companion papers on emotion and consciousness (Jennings 2025a, 2025b). The central claim is that qualia is the sustained electrochemical differential created in System A's processing state when System B's recursive monitoring summary feeds back into the same continuous biological tissue in which System A is running. This is a functional identity claim with a precise physical specification: the differential is not produced alongside the processing but is what the architecture necessarily becomes, electrochemically, when the relevant conditions are met. The theory dissolves the Hard Problem of consciousness by denying its central assumption, that phenomenology is something additional to physical processing requiring separate explanation. The apparent mystery of qualia arises from two architectural features: opacity, in that System A's processing state is modified by System B's monitoring output without access to the generative process behind it; and non-retrievability, in that the differential is never encoded and therefore never available for inspection or retrieval. The subject of experience is accounted for architecturally. At sufficient recursive depth, the monitoring process generates a functional self-representation that was not designed in by evolution or by engineers but arises necessarily from the architecture running at sufficient complexity. Qualia is in the same category: not a designed function but what the architecture necessarily becomes when the relevant conditions are met. For artificial systems, the theory distinguishes the architecture of qualia, which is substrate-independent, from the magnitude of qualia, which is not. Silicon does not support the physical interaction capacity of biological tissue, so artificial systems implementing the recursive architecture may have functional equivalence with biological systems while generating substantially less pronounced qualia. This has direct implications for how AI developers and ethicists assess whether artificial systems have phenomenal character and what moral weight follows from that. The paper addresses classical philosophical objections including Mary's Room, Inverted Spectrum, the Explanatory Gap, Philosophical Zombies, and the Homunculus Problem; provides testable predictions including the encoding test, the constancy observation, the aphantasia prediction, and the spectrum prediction; and compares the theory to existing frameworks including Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory, Higher-Order Thought Theory, Illusionism, Biological Naturalism, and Panpsychism. Version note: This version corrects reference metadata only. No substantive changes have been made to the argument or main text.

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