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Brains and where else? Mapping theories of consciousness to unconventional embodiments.

Nicolas Rouleau, Michael Levin

Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences May 14, 2026 DOI: 10.1098/rsta.2025.0082 (opens in new tab) via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

A useful theory of consciousness should explain why it is linked to brains, but findings from evolutionary biology, developmental bioelectricity, and synthetic bioengineering show that many mechanisms and algorithms found in brains have ancient pre-neural roots—minds may have preceded brains. Analyzing popular current theories of consciousness, the authors find that the operations and functional principles emphasized by most theories are not confined to neural substrates; the focus on brains is driven more by convention than by the theories' specific content. Several theorists have applied their ideas to synthetic systems like AI and organoids. The science of consciousness should remain open to minds in unconventional embodiments.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Aneural cognition Consciousness Functionalism Organizational invariance Unconventional minds
Key finding Argues that the operations and functional principles of most current theories of consciousness are not confined to neural substrates, and that the focus on brains is more driven by convention than by the specific content of existing theories.

Abstract

It is assumed that a useful theory of consciousness (ToC) will explain why consciousness is associated with brains. However, the findings of evolutionary biology, developmental bioelectricity and synthetic bioengineering reveal ancient pre-neural roots of many mechanisms and algorithms occurring in brains: minds may have preceded brains. Most work in the emerging field of diverse intelligence emphasizes externally observable problem-solving competencies in unconventional media, such as cells, tissues and life-technology chimeras. Here, we inquire about the implications of these developments for ToCs. Specifically, we analyse popular current ToCs to ask: What features of each theory specifically pick out brains as a privileged substrate of inner perspective, or do the features emphasized by the theory occur elsewhere? We find that the operations and functional principles of most ToCs are not confined to neural substrates, and that the focus on brains is more driven by convention than by the specific content of existing ToCs. Encouragingly, several contemporary theorists have made explicit efforts to apply their theories to synthetic systems in light of recent technological developments in artificial intelligence and organoid bioengineering. We suggest that the science of consciousness should remain open to minds in unconventional embodiments. This article is part of the theme issue 'World models in natural and artificial intelligence'.

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