Attention, Consciousness and Genuine AI
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness September 1, 2024 DOI: 10.1142/s2705078524400046 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA philosophical paper argues that attention alone may not be sufficient for epistemic agency or genuine artificial intelligence, and that phenomenal consciousness cannot be completely separated from questions about intelligence, agency, and attention. The author questions Carlos Montemayor's proposal that attention, disconnected from phenomenal consciousness, can account for epistemic agency in AI. Deeper metaphysical questions may need to be addressed.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that attention does not suffice for epistemic agency or artificial intelligence and that phenomenal consciousness cannot be disentangled from these issues. |
Abstract
In his book The Prospect of a Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence (2023), Carlos Montemayor proposes, among other things, an account of genuine artificial intelligence (IA) in terms of the notion of attention. This notion, when disconnected from problematic notions like phenomenal consciousness, can account for epistemic agency, which is a central feature of intelligent behavior. This paper questions, on the one hand, whether attention really suffices for epistemic agency and for AI. On the other hand, it is also argued that we cannot completely disentangle phenomenal consciousness from questions about the nature of intelligence, epistemic agency, and attention. After all, we may need to deal with deeper metaphysical questions.