Skip to content

Attention, Consciousness and Genuine AI

Víctor Cantero-Flores

Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness September 1, 2024 DOI: 10.1142/s2705078524400046 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that attention does not suffice for epistemic agency or artificial intelligence and that phenomenal consciousness cannot be disentangled from these issues.

Abstract

In his book The Prospect of a Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence (2023), Carlos Montemayor proposes, among other things, an account of genuine artificial intelligence (IA) in terms of the notion of attention. This notion, when disconnected from problematic notions like phenomenal consciousness, can account for epistemic agency, which is a central feature of intelligent behavior. This paper questions, on the one hand, whether attention really suffices for epistemic agency and for AI. On the other hand, it is also argued that we cannot completely disentangle phenomenal consciousness from questions about the nature of intelligence, epistemic agency, and attention. After all, we may need to deal with deeper metaphysical questions.