Sims and Vulnerability: On the Ethics of Creating Emulated Minds.

If it becomes possible to build artificial minds capable of experience, such as whole brain emulations (WBEs), these beings will likely exhibit vulnerability, which raises distinct ethical issues. This paper argues that concerns about vulnerability are primarily matters of institutional design rather than individual ethics, whether for humanlike or animal-like emulations. The author concludes that a competitive and poly-centric institutional framework is more likely to protect the interests of these simulated minds than a monopolistic and centralized one.

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Abstract

It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability - given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature - that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with WBEs. I will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized.