Can Silicon Be Conscious? A TNA Analysis of the Limits of Operational Systems

Consciousness cannot be guaranteed by computational complexity alone. Through the Theory of Axiomatic Necessity, this paper shows that purely operational dynamics—whether in biological neurons or silicon transistors—are structurally insufficient to produce semantic content, normativity, or qualia. The explanatory gap facing materialist frameworks is not an engineering limitation but a structural constraint: a local operational domain cannot generate the admissibility structures required to legitimize its own interpretation. The question of artificial consciousness remains undecidable within computational models, as any conscious system necessarily presupposes an irreducible, non-operational structural core.

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Abstract

This paper challenges contemporary functionalist assumptions regarding artificial consciousness by demonstrating through the Theory of Axiomatic Necessity (TNA) that computational complexity alone cannot guarantee subjective awareness. By integrating the Kripke-Wittgenstein rule-following paradox and the theorem of Failure of Local Closure, we show that purely operational dynamics ($N_0$)—whether executed via biological neurons or silicon transistors—are structurally insufficient to derive semantic content, normativity, and qualia. We argue that the explanatory gap facing materialist frameworks is not an engineering limitation but a structural constraint: a local operational domain cannot generate the admissibility structures ($N_1$) required to legitimize its own interpretation. Consequently, the question of artificial consciousness remains undecidable within computational models, as any conscious system necessarily presupposes an irreducible, non-operational structural core.