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The Problem of Qualia and Knowledge in Plato and Aristotle

Peter Sena Gawu, Husein Inusah

Philosophy Study August 28, 2019 DOI: 10.17265/2159-5313/2019.08.004 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The paper re-examines the debate on qualia and knowledge in the works of Plato and Aristotle, arguing that the relationship between subjective experience and knowledge has been an implicit tension in their philosophies. It connects this historical debate to the contemporary problem of qualia, as raised by Clarence I. Lewis and others in the mid-20th century, and explores how Plato and Aristotle's views have influenced theories of sense data. The core objective is to resurrect this debate as a contribution to modern philosophical discussions about qualia.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Philosophy
Key finding Argues that Plato and Aristotle's implicit debate on qualia and knowledge has been underexplored and can inform contemporary theories of sense data and the problem of qualia.

Abstract

This paper sparks the debate of qualia and knowledge in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The debate on the relevance and logical chronology of qualia and knowledge has been an implicit tension in the works of Plato and Aristotle. However, we seldom find scholars exploring these aspects of Plato-Aristotle philosophy and connecting it to the contemporary debate of qualia. It is on this account that this paper re-examines Plato and Aristotle’s debate on the relevance of qualia to knowledge and how this debate has influenced theories relating to sense data. The core objective of this paper is to resurrect the debate of qualia and knowledge in the works of the legends as a way of contributing to the contemporary problem of qualia as suggested by Clarence I. Lewis and others in mid-20th century.

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