Explaining temporal qualia

The experience of motion and change has a 'flow-like' quality, often called temporal qualia. Some philosophers argue that time must objectively pass for us to have this experience, while others concede that time appears to pass but falsely. This paper rejects both views, arguing that the concept of 'passage' does not help explain temporal qualia and instead confuses the issue. It offers a reductionist account of temporal qualia that avoids any reference to passage, drawing support from empirical studies of motion perception.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.