The Extended Mind and the Extended Agent

The extended mind thesis (EMT) claims that mental processes can extend beyond the brain into the environment. This paper identifies a shortcoming in the original EMT and proposes an ontological clarification using a four-dimensional ontology. By defining a notion of the extended agent based on this ontology, the authors analyze problems of EMT and clarify the relationship between the brain-centered view and the extended view. The argument suggests that a four-dimensional ontology can resolve conceptual issues in the debate, offering a more precise understanding of how cognitive processes may be distributed across brain, body, and world.

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Abstract

Abstract Since Clark and Chalmers proposed the extended mind thesis (EMT), philosophers have been holding intensive discussions on this topic. EMT is closely related with the concept of mind, scientific methodologies on the mental, and understanding of cognitive science. The science of extended mind is a new research program in the cognitive science that is opposed to the view of the traditional cognitive science. In this paper, we show a shortcoming of the original EMT and propose an ontological clarification of EMT. For this purpose, we take a four-dimensional ontology and define a notion of extended agent based on this ontology. Then, we analyze problems of EMT using this notion. Through these discussions, we clarify the relationship between the brain-centered view and the view of EMT.