Comment on "A thermodynamic approach to the problem of consciousness".

A philosophical and thermodynamic critique of Beshkar's conjecture that qualia and consciousness have a negentropic nature. The author disputes the fundamental assumptions of Beshkar's argument, which posits that qualia are building blocks of consciousness, both are subjective and non-observable, and arise from negentropic processes that nonetheless obey the second law of thermodynamics. The critique examines these assumptions from a thermodynamic perspective and scrutinizes the concept of subjectivity in more detail, arguing against the claim that quantum laws erase traces of negentropic processes. The paper engages with the theoretical foundations of qualia and consciousness without presenting empirical data.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Recently, Beshkar has published a paper on the nature of qualia. His argument is based on several assumptions leading to a conjecture that qualia have a negentropic nature and so as consciousness. The assumptions are: 1) quale (singular of qualia) is the building block of consciousness and thus they are equivalent, 2) qualia and consciousness are both subjective and non-observable by any experiment, 3) qualia/consciousness are negentropic (ΔS<0) structures and yet the product of a universal evolution (ΔS≥0) in an attempt to maximize entropy (ΔS=0), 4) "quale is a structure generated by a specific region of the cerebral cortex", 5) subjectivity/non-observability of qualia/consciousness stems from quantum laws erasing the trace of negentropic processes. Herein, the fundamental assumptions of this conjecture are disputed from the thermodynamic point of view, and subjectivity is scrutinized in more details. Throughout this paper, the word "observer" implies a conscious observer.