Circumnavigating the causal pairing problem with hylomorphism and the integrated information theory of consciousness
Synthese September 25, 2019 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02403-6 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA philosophical problem known as the causal pairing problem threatens to show that nonphysical minds cannot cause anything. This article argues that a dualist view called neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can avoid this problem. After explaining the problem and the hylomorphic framework, the author offers an account of how causal pairing works based on a core hylomorphic principle. The article then suggests that integrated information theory, a leading neuroscientific theory of consciousness, can adopt a similar approach to solve the causal pairing problem for itself.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Computer science Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can circumvent the causal pairing problem and that integrated information theory can learn from this approach. |
Abstract
The causal pairing problem allegedly renders nonphysical minds causally impotent. This article demonstrates how a dualist view I call neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can circumnavigate the causal pairing problem. After explicating the problem and hylomorphism, I provide an account of causal pairing that appeals to a foundational tenet of hylomorphism. Subsequently, I suggest that a prominent view of consciousness in theoretical neuroscience—the integrated information theory—can learn from hylomorphism and likewise account for causal pairing.