Quantum Superpositions of Conscious States in a Minimal Integrated Information Model

A quantum circuit called a 'Schrödinger's dyad' could place a minimal system into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states, as described by Integrated Information Theory (IIT). The authors prove a structural constraint on standard collapse dynamics: if too few collapse operators govern the system, collapse rates cannot depend solely on qualitative differences between experiences. Avoiding this limitation requires many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for simple systems. This complexity challenges claims that IIT-based collapse theories are especially experimentally tractable, and the difficulty extends to any theory distinguishing experiences using rich internal organization.

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Abstract

Could there be quantum superpositions of conscious states, as suggested by the Wigner's friend thought experiment? Mathematical theories of consciousness, notably Integrated Information Theory (IIT), make this question more precise by associating physical systems with both quantitative amounts of consciousness and structural characterizations of conscious states. Motivated by a recent proposal that ties wave function collapse to integrated information, we construct a simple quantum circuit that would place a minimal system -- a feedback dyad -- into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states. This "Schrödinger's dyad" provides a controlled setting for evaluating a central desideratum of consciousness-based collapse models: that collapse rates depend on how different the experiences in the superposition are. We prove a structural constraint on collapse dynamics of a standard (Lindblad) type: if collapse is governed by too few collapse operators, collapse rates cannot in general be made to depend solely on qualitative differences between conscious states. Avoiding this limitation requires introducing many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for very simple systems. This proliferation bears directly on claims that IIT-based collapse theories may be especially experimentally tractable, since the required dynamics becomes highly complex. More generally, the difficulty is not specific to IIT: any Wigner-style collapse theory that distinguishes experiences using rich internal organization (such as neural connectivity in addition to neural state) will face a comparable explosion in dynamical complexity.