Filled/non-filled pairs: an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness

Perceptual filling-in occurs when the brain inserts visual properties like color or motion into the visual field despite no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces filled/non-filled image pairs that look identical but differ in the amount of filling-in they require. The authors argue these pairs are important for testing theories of consciousness. They review research suggesting filling-in involves brain activity with higher integrated information (Phi) compared to veridical perceptions. The filled/non-filled pairs pose a challenge to integrated information theory, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences should depend on brain processes with identical Phi.

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Abstract

Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one’s visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with relatively high integrated information (Phi) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Phi.