Mind, Matter, and Freedom in Quantum Mechanics and the de Broglie-Bohm Theory
arXiv Preprint Archive October 28, 2025 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractQuantum mechanics is often claimed to have refuted determinism, opened the door to free will, shed light on consciousness, refuted realism in favor of idealism, or undermined reductionism. This paper argues that none of these philosophical conclusions are necessary or desirable. By adopting the de Broglie–Bohm theory (Bohmian mechanics), one can straightforwardly account for quantum phenomena without endorsing any of these claims.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Quant-ph |
| Key finding | Argues that quantum mechanics does not necessarily support philosophical claims about determinism, free will, consciousness, idealism, or reductionism, and that the de Broglie–Bohm theory offers an alternative that avoids these implications. |
Abstract
There are several important philosophical problems to which quantum mechanics is often said to have made significant contributions: - Determinism: quantum theory has been taken to refute determinism; -Free Will: in turn, this is thought to open the door to free will; - The mind-body problem: relatedly, it is sometimes said to shed light on consciousness; - Idealism: more radically, quantum theory is assumed to have refuted realism and to have placed the observer at the center of the world; - Reductionism: even granting realism, it has been claimed that quantum theory undermines reductionism. Our main thesis in this paper is that none of this is either necessary or desirable. By adopting the de Broglie--Bohm theory (or Bohmian mechanics), one can straightforwardly account for quantum phenomena without endorsing any of these claims.